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Abstract. We consider two risk-averse financial agents who negotiate the price of an illiquid
indivisible contingent claim in an incomplete semimartingale market environment. Under
the assumption that the agents are exponential utility maximizers with non-traded random
endowments, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for negotiation to be successful,
i.e., for the trade to occur. We also study the asymptotic case where the size of the claim is
small compared to the random endowments and we give a full characterization in this case.
Finally, we study a partial-equilibrium problem for a bundle of divisible claims and establish
existence and uniqueness. A number of technical results on conditional indifference prices is
provided.
Key words and phrases. exponential utility, incomplete markets, indifference prices, conditional indiffer-
ence prices, partial equilibrium, random endowment, risk-aversion, semimartingales.
2000 Mathematics Subject Classification. Primary: 91B70; Secondary: 91B30, 60G35.
Both authors were supported in part by the National Science Foundation under award number DMS-0706947 during the
preparation of this work. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of
the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Science Foundation.
The authors would like to thank Hans Fo¨llmer, Lorenzo Garlappi, Stathis Tompaidis, Thaleia Zariphopoulou, and the
participants of the 11th International Congress on Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, IME, Piraeus, Greece, July 2007
for fruitful discussions and good advice.
1
21. Introduction
1.1. A description of the problem. In an ideal complete market, each contingent claim can be perfectly
replicated and, thus, a rational agent is indifferent between the (random) claim itself and its (deterministic)
replication price. Abundant empirical evidence shows that the real financial markets are far from complete;
only a small portion of contingent claims can be replicated in the market to a satisfactory degree. A
non-specific abstract notion of rationality is no longer sufficient to single out a unique “fair price” of any
contingent claim. This effect is demonstrable in over-the-counter transactions where (typically) two agents
negotiate a price of a single, indivisible, not-perfectly-replicable contingent claim. The final outcome of such
a negotiation eventually hinges upon two idiosyncratic factors - the agents’ attitude towards risk and their
negotiation skills. The focus of the present paper is the former. We ask the following question: Under what
conditions on the claim whose price is being negotiated, the liquid-market environment and the agents’ risk
attitudes will a mutually beneficial agreement be feasible?
Our modelling choices are informed by simplicity, but we steer clear of oversimplification. In particular,
we assume that the two agents are expected utility maximizers in the von Neumann-Morgenstern sense, with
a common investment horizon T . For simplicity and analytic tractability we assume that both agents’ utility
functions are exponential, possibly with different risk-aversion parameters. An important feature which is
not present in a major part of the past work on the subject is the presence of random endowments - the
agents are assumed to hold an illiquid portfolio and the risk assessment of any contingent claim will depend
heavily upon its (co-)relation with this illiquid portfolio. In addition to the illiquid random endowments,
both agents have access to a liquid incomplete financial market modelled by a general locally-bounded
semimartingale. Also, we assume that all pay-offs are already discounted in time-0 terms; this way we can
freely compare values corresponding to different points in time. Mathematical-finance literature abounds
with information on the utility-maximization problem for a variety of utility concepts (see, for instance,
Karatzas et al. (1990), Kramkov and Schachermayer (1999), Schachermayer (2001), Cvitanic´ et al. (2001),
Owen (2002), Owen and Zˇitkovic´ (2006)).
Under the conditions described above, the two agents meet at time 0 when one of the agents (the seller)
offers a contingent claim with time-T payoff B to the other one (the buyer) in exchange for a lump-sum
payment p at time t = 0. Our central question, posed above, can now be made more precise and split into
two separate components:
1. Is there a number p ∈ R such that the exchange of the contingent claim B for a lump sum p is
(strictly) beneficial for both agents?
2. If more than one such p exists, can we determine the exact outcome of the negotiation?
The net gain B−p will be beneficial for the buyer if he/she can find a trading strategy such that the resulting
wealth at time T gives rise to a higher expected utility than the one he/she would be able to obtain without
3B − p. A similar criterion applies to the seller. In case the answer to question 1. is positive, we say that the
agents are in agreement.
While we give a fairly complete answer to question 1., we only touch upon the issues involved in question
2. In fact, it is not possible to give a definitive answer to this question without a precise model of the
negotiation process (see, for instance, Bazerman and Neale (1992)). A partial answer is possible, however,
when the indivisibility assumption is dropped (see Section 5).
1.2. Our results and how they relate to existing research. Our results are naturally split into 4 parts
which correspond to Sections 3, 4, 5 and Appendix A in the present paper:
1. Abstract agreement: We start with the study of the class G◦ of all (appropriately regular) contingent
claims B for which the agents are in agreement. It is, perhaps, surprising that unless non-replicable random
endowments are present, no contingent claims will lead to agreement, even for agents with different risk-
aversion coefficients. When the random endowments are indeed present, we give a necessary and sufficient
condition for the set G◦ to be non-empty. This characterization is closely related to the notion of optimal
risk sharing which was first studied in the context of insurance/reinsurance negotiation (see, for instance,
Bu¨hlmann and Jewell (1979), Dana and Scarsini (2007)) and recently developed for in more general settings
(see Fo¨llmer and Schied (2004), Barrieu and El Karoui (2004), Jouini et al. (2006) and Filipovic´ and Kupper
(2008a)).
2. Agreement for a specific claim - residual risk and approximation: Next, we consider a question which
is in a sense dual to the one tackled in the previous part: is there a criterion for an agreement about a
given claim B? We propose two approaches: one through the notion of residual risk and the other based on
asymptotic approximation of conditional indifference prices for small quantities.
Residual risk (introduced in Musiela and Zariphopoulou (2004)) of a random liability is defined as the
difference between the liability’s payoff and the terminal value of the optimal risk-monitoring strategy at
maturity. We establish the following criterion, made precise in the body of the paper: a claim is mutually
agreeable if and only if it reduces the residual risk for both agents.
The other approach provides an explicit criterion in the asymptotic case when the size of the contingent
claim B is small compared to the size of the agents’ random endowments. It is possible to phrase the
agreement problem in terms of a relationship between the buyer’s and the seller’s conditional indifference
price for the claim, so it is not unusual that an asymptotic study of these quantities plays a major role. More
precisely, we establish a rather general Taylor-type approximation of the conditional exponential indifference
price for locally bounded semimartingales on left-continuous filtrations. These approximations are then used
to give simple asymptotic criteria for agreeability, as well as the asymptotic size of the interval of mutually-
agreeable prices. Since it is not possible to obtain closed-form representations of indifference prices in general
market models, such asymptotic results can be very useful even beyond the agreement problem.
4Asymptotic techniques are not new in utility maximization problems. In Kramkov and Sirbu (2007),
a first order approximation of the optimal hedging strategy in a semimartingale market for general utili-
ties (defined on the positive real line) is provided. This generalizes the results of Henderson (2002) and
Henderson and Hobson (2002). For exponential utility, the first derivative of the indifference price for a vec-
tor of claims is given in Ilhan et al. (2005). By imposing the assumption of left-continuity on the filtration,
we generalize their result (as well as the asymptotic approximation in Sircar and Zariphopoulou (2005)) by
providing a second order approximation of the price for a vector of claims.
3. Partial equilibrium prices: In the third part of the paper we look into the following, related, question: if
the agents are allowed to choose not only the price of the claim, but also the quantity traded, can the market
clearing (partial equilibrium) conditions be used to compute these two quantities? We consider bundles of
several contingent claims and prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium price-quantities, as well as a
formula for the partial equilibrium price. The existence results of various types of competitive equilibria are a
staple of quantitative economics literature, and have recently made their way into mathematical finance (see,
among others, Dana and Le Van (2000), Heath and Ku (2004), Zˇitkovic´ (2006), Burgert and Ru¨schendorf
(2007) and Filipovic´ and Kupper (2008b)). Our incomplete partial-equilibrium setting is, however, new and
not covered by any of the existing results. As we already mentioned above, it is only in the present setting
that we can say something about question 2., i.e., about the realized price p of the offered contingent claim
B.
4. Conditional indifference prices: Our structural results rely heavily on the notion of conditional indif-
ference prices. Utility-indifference prices were first introduced in Hodges and Neuberger (1989), and then
further investigated and developed by a large number of authors (see, for instance, Karatzas and Kou (1996),
Davis (1997), Frittelli (2000), Rouge and El Karoui (2000), Zariphopoulou (2001), Hugonnier et al. (2005),
Mania and Schweizer (2005), Klo¨ppel and Schweizer (2007)). The special case (pertinent to the present
paper) of exponential indifference prices was studied, e.g., in Frittelli (2000), Rouge and El Karoui (2000),
Zariphopoulou (2001), Delbaen et al. (2002) and Mania and Schweizer (2005).
In the presence of an illiquid random endowment, we talk about a conditional indifference price (also known
as relative indifference price in Musiela and Zariphopoulou (2003) and Stoikov (2006)). In the exponential
world, some of its properties can be obtained by a simple change of measure which, effectively, removes the
conditionality. Other properties, however, cannot be dealt with in that manner. The goal of the last part
of this work is to establish certain properties of conditional indifference prices in a general semimartingale
market setting. We show, for instance, a rather unexpected fact that conditional indifference prices (unlike
their unconditional versions) do not have to be monotone in the risk-aversion parameter.
1.3. The structure of the paper. In Section 2, we describe the market model and introduce necessary
notation. The notion of agreement is introduced and our main abstract results are proven in Section 3. In
Section 4 we study the small-quantity asymptotics of conditional indifference prices, and use it to provide
5an agreement criterion. An example in the Brownian setting is also presented. The topics of Section 5 are
existence and uniqueness of partial equilibrium price-quantities for vectors of contingent claims. In Appendix
A we state some properties of conditional indifference prices, and in Appendix B we give an outline of some
known results on residual risk.
2. Some modelling and notational preliminaries
2.1. The financial market. Our model of the financial market is based on a filtered probability space
(Ω,F ,F,P), F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ], T > 0, which satisfies the usual conditions of right-continuity and completeness.
There are d + 1 traded assets (d ∈ N), whose discounted price processes are modelled by an Rd+1-valued
locally bounded semimartingale (S
(0)
t ;St)t∈[0,T ] = (S
(0)
t ;S
(1)
t , . . . , S
(d)
t )t∈[0,T ]. The first asset S
(0)
t plays the
role of a nume´raire security or a discount factor. Operationally, we simply set S
(0)
t ≡ 1, for all t ∈ [0, T ], a.s.
2.2. Agent behaviour. Placing ourselves in the von Neumann-Morgenstern framework, we assume that
each market participant evaluates the risk of an uncertain position X at time T according to the expected
utility EP[U(X + E)], where U is a utility function and E is the random endowment (accumulated illiquid
wealth) and P is a subjective probability measure. For technical reasons, we restrict our attention to
E ∈ L∞(F) and the class of exponential utilities
U(x) = − exp(−γx), x ∈ R
where the constant γ ∈ (0,∞) is the (absolute) risk aversion coefficient.
2.3. Admissible strategies and the absence of arbitrage. A financial agent invests in the market by
choosing a portfolio strategy ϑ in an admissibility class Θ, to be specified below. The resulting gains process
(Gϑt )t∈[0,T ] is simply the stochastic integral G
ϑ
t = (ϑ · S)t =
∫ t
0 ϑu dSu. Due to the exponential nature
of the utility functions considered here, we follow the setup introduced in Mania and Schweizer (2005) or
Delbaen et al. (2002). Before we give a precise description of the aforementioned setΘ, we need to introduce
several concepts related to the no-arbitrage requirement. We start with the setMa of absolutely continuous
local martingale measures, where
Ma = {Q≪ P : S is a local martingale under Q}
The set Me of all elements Q of Ma which additionally satisfy Q ∼ P is called the set of equivalent local
martingale measures. For a probability measure Q on (Ω,F), we define
H(Q|P) =


EP
[
dQ
dP
ln
(
dQ
dP
)]
Q≪ P,
+∞, otherwise
6The (extended) positive number H(Q|P) is called the relative entropy of the probability measure Q with
respect to probability measure P. For details on the notion of relative entropy we refer the interested reader
to Grandits and Rheinla¨nder (2002) or Frittelli (2000). We set
Me,f = {Q ∈Me : H(Q|P) <∞}
and enforce the following assumption
Assumption 2.1. Me,f 6= ∅.
Assumption 2.1 trivially implies that Me 6= ∅ which, in turn, guarantees that no arbitrage opportunities
exist in the market (a stronger statement of “no free lunch with vanishing risk” will hold, as well). The
additional requirement in Assumption 2.1 is common in the literature and it ensures that the choice of the
exponential function for the utility leads to a well-defined behavior for utility-maximizing agents (see, among
others, Delbaen et al. (2002), Frittelli (2000), Becherer (2001) and Mania and Schweizer (2005)).
Having introduced the required families of probability measures, we turn back to definition of the class
Θ of admissible strategies:
(2.1) Θ = {ϑ ∈ L (S) : (ϑ · S) is a Q-martingale, ∀Q ∈Me,f}
where L(S) is the set of all predictable (d+1)-dimensional S-integrable processes on [0, T ]. More information
about the set Θ of admissible strategies is given in Mania and Schweizer (2005) (see also remarks on the set
Θ2 in Delbaen et al. (2002)).
We remind the reader that L0(F) denotes the set of all (P-a.s. equivalent classes of) F -measurable random
variables. A random variable B ∈ L0(F) is said to be replicable if there exists a constant c and an admissible
strategy ϑ ∈ Θ such that B = c+ (ϑ · S)T a.s.; the set of replicable random variables will be denoted by R.
More generally, we introduce the following equivalence relation between random variables in L0(F):
Definition 2.2. We call two random variables B,C ∈ L0(F) risk equivalent or equal up to replicability and
write B ∼ C, if the difference B − C is replicable.
It is clear that the relation ∼ is an equivalence relation on L0(F) (sinceΘ is a vector space). We note that
the zero equivalence class coincides with the set R of the replicable random variables. For future reference,
we let R∞ = R∩ L∞(F) denote the set of all (essentially) bounded replicable random variables.
2.4. Some special probability measures. The expectation operator under a probability measure Q is
denoted by EQ[·], where the superscript Q is omitted in the case of the (subjective) measure P. Also, for a
random vector B = (B1, B2, ..., Bn), EQ[B] stands for the vector (EQ[B1],EQ[B2], ...,EQ[Bn]) ∈ Rn.
For a random variable B ∈ L0(F) with E[exp(B)] <∞, the probability measure whose Radon-Nikodym
derivative with respect to P is given by exp(B)
E[exp(B)] , is denoted by PB. Furthermore, Q
(0) denotes the probability
measure in Ma with the minimal relative entropy with respect to P i.e., the probability measure for which
H(Q(0)|P) ≤ H(Q|P) for all Q ∈ Ma. It is a consequence of Assumption 2.1 that the probability measure
7Q(0) exists, is unique and belongs to Me,f (see Frittelli (2000), page 43, Theorem 2.2). Similarly, for every
B such that E[exp(B)] <∞, there exists a unique probability measure Q(B) ∈Ma such that H(Q(B)|PB) ≤
H(Q|PB) for all Q ∈Ma (see Delbaen et al. (2002), page 103).
3. A notion of agreement between financial agents
3.1. Utility maximization and indirect utility. Given their risk profiles, financial agents trade in the
financial market with the goal of maximizing expected utility. More precisely, an agent with initial wealth
x ∈ R, risk-aversion coefficient γ and random endowment E ∈ L∞ will choose a portfolio process ϑ ∈ Θ
so as to maximize the expected utility E[− exp(−γ((x + ϑ · S)T + E))]. The value function uγ(x|E) of the
corresponding optimization problem is given by
uγ(x|E) = sup
ϑ∈Θ
E
[
− exp
(
−γ
(
x+ (ϑ · S)T + E
)) ]
, x ∈ R.(3.1)
Overloading the notation slightly, for any random variable B ∈ L∞(F) (interpreted as a contingent payoff
with maturity T ) we define the indirect utility of B by uγ(B|E) = uγ(0|E +B), i.e.
(3.2) uγ(B|E) = sup
ϑ∈Θ
E
[
− exp(−γ ((ϑ · S)T + E +B))
]
.
Remark 3.1. Thanks to the choice of the exponential utility, the case where the agents have different subjec-
tive probability measures, say P1 6= P2, is also covered. Indeed, if we assume that P1 ≈ P2 and ln(
dP1
dP2
) ∈ L∞,
we can reduce the analysis to the case of two agents with the same subjective measure, say P2, by adding
γ1 ln(
dP1
dP2
) to first agent’s random endowment.
3.2. A preference relation and a notion of acceptability. The indirect utility uγ(·|E) induces a pref-
erence relation γ,E , on L∞(F); for B1, B2 ∈ L∞(F), we set
B1 γ,E B2 if uγ(B1|E) ≤ uγ(B2|E).
In words, the payoff B2 is preferable to the payoff B1 for the agent with random endowment E and risk
aversion coefficient γ, if the total payoff E +B2 yields more indirect utility than the payoff E +B1.
The set of all payoffs B ∈ L∞(F) such that 0 γ,E B is called the (γ, E)-acceptance set, and we denote it
by Aγ(E). Equivalently, we have
Aγ(E) =
{
B ∈ L∞(F) : sup
ϑ∈Θ
E
[
− exp(−γ ((ϑ · S)T + E))
]
≤
≤ sup
ϑ∈Θ
E
[
− exp(−γ ((ϑ · S)T + E +B))
]}
.
(3.3)
Closely related to the relation γ,E is its strict version ≺γ,E defined by
B1 ≺γ,E B2 if uγ(B1|E) < uγ(B2|E), B1, B2 ∈ L
∞(F).
The strict (γ, E)-acceptance set A◦γ(E), is defined by A
◦
γ(E) = {B ∈ L
∞ : uγ(0|E) < uγ(B|E)}, and the
representation analogous to (3.3) (with ≤ replaced by <) holds.
8It is a consequence of the choice of the exponential utility function that the addition of any constant
initial wealth x ∈ R to random endowment E does not influence the acceptance sets Aγ(E) and A◦γ(E). More
generally, we have the following simple proposition, the proof of which is standard. We remind the reader
that a set A is called monotone if B ≥ C, a.s. and C ∈ A imply B ∈ A.
Proposition 3.2. For every E ∈ L∞ and γ ∈ (0,∞), the sets Aγ(E) and A◦γ(E) are convex, monotone and
(3.4) E1 ∼ E2 implies Aγ(E1) = Aγ(E2) and A
◦
γ(E1) = A
◦
γ(E2)
3.3. Conditional indifference prices. The acceptance set Aγ(E) can be used to introduce the notion of
a conditional indifference price. The conditional writer’s indifference price ν(w)(B; γ|E) of the contingent
claim B ∈ L∞(F) is defined by
ν(w)(B; γ|E) = inf {p ∈ R : p−B ∈ Aγ(E)} .(3.5)
i.e., ν(w)(B; γ|E) is the minimum amount that the agent with preference relation γ,E will be willing to sell
the claim with payoff B for. Similarly, the conditional buyer’s indifference price ν(b)(B; γ|E) is defined by
ν(b)(B; γ|E) = sup {p ∈ R : B − p ∈ Aγ(E)} .(3.6)
i.e., ν(b)(B; γ|E) is the maximum amount that the agent with preference relation γ,E will offer for a con-
tingent claim with payoff B.
In the special case where E ∼ 0, the corresponding prices are called unconditional indifference prices
(or, simply, indifference prices) and are denoted by ν(w) (B; γ) and ν(b) (B; γ). A compendium of relevant
properties of both conditional and unconditional indifference prices is given in Appendix A.
The notion of the indifference price has been studied by many authors (see, among others, Hodges and Neuberger
(1989), Rouge and El Karoui (2000),Henderson (2002) and Musiela and Zariphopoulou (2004)). The defini-
tion of the conditional indifference price under exponential utility was given in Becherer (2001) for general
semimartingale model, in Musiela and Zariphopoulou (2005) for a binomial case model and in Stoikov (2006)
for a diffusion model (where the price is called relative indifference price). A discussion of the conditional
indifference price under general utility functions is given in Owen and Zˇitkovic´ (2006).
3.4. Agreement. The present paper deals with the interaction between two financial agents, with risk
aversion coefficients γ1 and γ2 and random endowments E1, E2 ∈ L∞(F).
Definition 3.3. A contingent claim B ∈ L∞(F) is said to be
(1) mutually agreeable if there exists a number p ∈ R such that p−B ∈ Aγ1(E1) and B − p ∈ Aγ2(E2).
(2) strictly mutually agreeable if there exists a number p ∈ R such that p − B ∈ A◦γ1(E1) and B − p ∈
A◦γ2(E2).
If a claim B is (strictly) mutually agreeable, the set of all p ∈ R such that the conditions in (1) (or (2) in
the strict case) above hold is called the set of (strictly) mutually agreeable prices for B.
9A discussion related to our notion of mutually agreeability is given in Jouini et al. (2006), subsection 3.6,
for cash invariant monetary utility functions, but without the presence of a financial market.
Using the conditional writer’s and buyer’s indifference prices, ν(w)(·; γ1|E1) and ν(b)(·; γ2|E2) defined above,
we can give a simple characterization of the set of mutually-agreeable prices.
Proposition 3.4. A claim B ∈ L∞(F) is mutually agreeable if and only if
(3.7) ν(w)(B; γ1|E1) ≤ ν
(b)(B; γ2|E2).
In that case, the set of mutually-agreeable prices for B is given by
[ν(w)(B; γ1|E1), ν
(b)(B; γ2|E2)].
Remark 3.5.
(1) A version of Proposition 3.4 for strict mutually-agreeable prices with strict inequality in (3.7) and the
interval [ν(w)(B; γ1|E1), ν(b)(B; γ2|E2)] replaced by its interior (ν(w)(B; γ1|E1), ν(b)(B; γ2|E2)) holds.
(2) For a contingent claim B ∈ L∞(F) \ R∞, each (strictly) mutually agreeable price p of B satisfies
p ∈ (infQ∈Ma E
Q[B], supQ∈Ma E
Q[B]) (see, e.g., Owen and Zˇitkovic´ (2006), Proposition 7.2) i.e.,
every mutually agreeable price is an arbitrage-free price. Trivially, every claim B ∈ R∞ is mutually
agreeable and the mutually agreeable price is unique and equal to the unique arbitrage-free price.
3.5. The set of all mutually agreeable claims. It will be important in the sequel to introduce separate
notation for the set of all (strictly) mutually agreeable claims:
G = {B ∈ L∞ : B is mutually agreeable} , and,
G◦ = {B ∈ L∞ : B is strictly mutually agreeable} .
We remind the reader that R∞ is the set of all replicable claims in L∞(F).
Proposition 3.6.
(1) G is convex and σ(L∞,L1)-closed.
(2) G ∩ (−G) = R∞, G◦ ∩ (−G◦) = ∅,
(3) G = L∞ if and only if R∞ = L∞.
Proof.
(1) The convexity of G follows from the convexity of ν(w)(·; γ1|E1) and concavity of ν(b)(·; γ2|E2) (see
Proposition A.2). As for the closedness, it will be enough to note that ν(w)(·; γ1|E1) : L∞ → R
is lower semi-continuous and ν(b)(·; γ2|E2) : L∞ → R is upper semi-continuous with respect to the
weak-* topology σ(L∞,L1) (see Corollary A.4).
(2) Trivially, R∞ ⊆ G ∩ (−G). For a claim B ∈ G ∩ (−G), there exists p, pˆ ∈ R such that p − B ∈
Aγ1(E1) and B − p ∈ Aγ2(E2) , as well as pˆ + B ∈ Aγ1(E1) and −B − pˆ ∈ Aγ2(E2). It follows, by
convexity of Aγ1(E1) that
1
2 (p+ pˆ) =
1
2 (p−B + pˆ+B) ∈ Aγ1(E1), i.e., uγ1(0|E1) ≤ uγ1(
1
2 (p+ pˆ)|E1).
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The strict monotonicity of the value-function uγ1(.|E1) for deterministic arguments implies that
1
2 (p + pˆ) ≥ 0. Applying the same line of reasoning to Aγ2(E2) and the value function uγ2(.|E2),
we get that − 12 (p + pˆ) ≥ 0, and, consequently, p = −pˆ. Using the definitions (3.5) and (3.6) of
the conditional indifference prices we easily get that ν(b)(B; γ1|E1) ≥ p ≥ ν(w)(B; γ1|E1), which,
according to Corollary 3.9, implies that B ∈ R∞.
To prove the second claim, it suffices to note that G◦ ∩ R∞ = ∅. Indeed, ν(w)(B; γ1|E1) =
ν(b)(B; γ2|E2) = EQ[B] for B ∈ R∞ and all Q ∈Ma.
(3) If G = L∞ then L∞ ⊆ G ∩ (−G) so L∞ = R∞, by (2) above. Conversely, if L∞ = R∞ then
L∞ = G ∩ (−G) ⊆ G.

Remark 3.7. The weak-* topology σ(L∞,L1) in Proposition 3.6 can be replaced by an even weaker one,
namely the coarsest topology τ on L∞ which makes the expectation mappings EQ[·] : L∞ → R continuous
for each Q ∈Me,f .
3.6. No agreement without random endowments. The following, at first glance surprising, result
states that mere difference in risk-aversion is not enough for two exponential agents to agree on a price of
any contingent claim. Qualitatively different random endowments are needed.
Proposition 3.8 (Non-agreement with replicable random endowments). Suppose that E1 ∼ E2 ∼ 0. Then
G = R∞ and G◦ = ∅.
Proof. The limiting relationships in (A.10) and the monotonicity properties of the indifference prices (see
Proposition A.11) imply that
(3.8) ν(w)(B; γ1|E1) = ν
(w) (B; γ1) ≥ E
Q(0) [B] ≥ ν(b) (B; γ2) = ν
(b)(B; γ2|E2), ∀B ∈ L
∞.
Therefore, the strict inequality ν(w)(B; γ1|E1) < ν(b)(B; γ2|E2) - needed for the strong agreement - cannot
hold. Consequently, G◦ = ∅.
If B ∈ G, (3.8) implies that ν(w)(B; γ1|E1) = ν(w) (B; γ1) = EQ
(0)
[B] = limγ→0 ν
(w) (B; γ). Therefore, the
function γ 7→ ν(w) (B; γ) can not be strictly increasing on (0,∞), so, by Proposition A.11, we must have
B ∈ R∞. Hence, G ⊆ R∞, and part (2) of Proposition 3.6 implies that G = R∞. 
Our following result, Corollary 3.9, follows directly from Proposition 3.8 and the fact that the conditional
indifference price becomes unconditional if the measure P is changed to P−γE (see Proposition A.1 and the
discussion at the beginning of subsection A.2).
Corollary 3.9. Suppose that E1 ∼ E2. Then for every γ > 0 and B ∈ L∞, we have

ν(w)(B; γ|E1) > ν(b)(B; γ|E2) for B /∈ R∞,
ν(w)(B; γ|E1) = ν(b)(B; γ|E2) otherwise.
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3.7. Agreement with random endowments. Proposition 3.8 states that the absence of random endow-
ments is a sufficient condition for the lack of (strict) agreement. Is it also necessary? Given the result
of Proposition 3.4, the question of the existence of non-replicable mutually agreeable claims leads to the
following optimization problem with value function Σ : (0,∞)2 × (L∞)2 → [0,+∞], where
(3.9) Σ(γ1, γ2, E1, E2) = sup
B∈L∞
(
ν(b)(B; γ2|E2)− ν
(w)(B; γ1|E1)
)
.
It follows directly from the Definition 3.3 of the set G that the following result holds:
Proposition 3.10. For E1, E2 ∈ L∞, γ1, γ2 ∈ (0,∞) and Σ = Σ(γ1, γ2, E1, E2), the following two statements
are equivalent
(a) G◦ 6= ∅, and
(b) Σ > 0.
Remark 3.11. The optimization problem above permits an interpretation in terms of the so-called optimal
risk-sharing problem. In case where the agents do not have access to a financial market, this problem
has recently been addressed by many authors (see, e.g., Barrieu and El Karoui (2004) for the exponential
utility case, Jouini et al. (2006) for monetary utility functionals and Barrieu and Scandolo (2008) for concave
preference functionals). When a financial market is present, the problem of optimal risk sharing when both
agents have exponential utility has been studied in Barrieu and El Karoui (2005), where the authors focus
on the form of the optimal structure.
Before we proceed, we need to define several terms.
Definition 3.12.
(1) The sum E = E1 + E2 of the random endowments of the agents is called the aggregate endowment.
(2) A pair (B1, B2) in (L∞)2 is called an allocation, while an allocation (B1, B2) such that B1+B2 = E
is called a feasible allocation; the set of all feasible allocations will be denoted by F (E)
(3) For an allocation (B1, B2), the sum ν
(b) (B1; γ1) + ν
(b) (B2; γ2), denoted by σ(B1, B2), is called the
score of (B1, B2). The difference σ(B1, B2)−σ(E1, E2) is called the excess score (where, for simplicity,
the parameters γ1 and γ2 are omitted from the notation).
By (A.8), the expression ν(b)(B; γ2|E2)− ν(w)(B; γ1|E1) appearing in (3.9) above can be rewritten as
ν(b)(B; γ2|E2)− ν
(w)(B; γ1|E1) = ν
(b)(B; γ2|E2) + ν
(b)(−B; γ1|E1) = (ν
(b) (B + E2; γ2)− ν
(b) (E2; γ2))
+ (ν(b) (−B + E1; γ1)− ν
(b) (E1; γ1)) = σ(E1 −B, E2 +B)− σ(E1, E2).
(3.10)
So that
Σ(γ1, γ2, E1, E2) = sup {σ(B1, B2) : (B1, B2) ∈ F (E)} − σ(E1, E2).
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In words, Σ is the maximized the excess score. If we think of the aggregate endowment E as the total wealth
of our two-agent economy, the solution of (3.9) (if it exists) will provide a redistribution of wealth so as to
maximize the (improvement in) the score. Even though there is no direct economic reason why the sum of
individual indifference prices should be maximized, Proposition 3.13 - which is a mere restatement of the
discussion above - explains why the score is a useful concept.
Proposition 3.13. For each B ∈ L∞, the following two statements are equivalent:
(1) B ∈ G◦, and
(2) σ(E1 −B, E2 +B) > σ(E1, E2).
The following proposition (compare to Theorem 2.3 in Barrieu and El Karoui (2005)) characterizes the
score-optimal allocation.
Proposition 3.14. For any E1, E2 ∈ L∞ and γ1, γ2 > 0 there exists B∗ ∈ L∞ such that
σ(E1 −B
∗, E2 +B
∗) ≥ σ(B1, B2), for all (B1, B2) ∈ F (E).
Moreover, B∗ is unique up to replicability and
B∗ ∼
γ1E1 − γ2E2
γ1 + γ2
.
Proof. By (3.10), it suffices to show that
ν(w) (−B∗ − E2; γ2) + ν
(w) (B∗ − E1; γ1) ≤ ν
(w) (−B − E2; γ2) + ν
(w) (B − E1; γ1)(3.11)
for all B ∈ L∞, which is, in turn, a consequence of Lemma A.7. Indeed, it states that
ν(w) (B − E1; γ1) + ν
(w) (−B − E2; γ2) ≥ ν
(w) (−E1 − E2; γ˜) ,
with equality if and only if
γ1
γ˜
(B − E1) ∼
γ2
γ˜
(−B − E2), i.e., B ∼
γ1E1 − γ2E2
γ1 + γ2
.

Corollary 3.15. The following statements are equivalent:
(1) G◦ = ∅,
(2) B∗ = γ1E1−γ2E2
γ1+γ2
is replicable, and
(3) γ1
γ2
E1 ∼ E2.
Remark 3.16. We can relate the existence of mutually agreeable non-replicable claims with the well-known
notion of Pareto optimality. More precisely, an allocation (B1, B2) ∈ F (E) is called Pareto optimal if
∄(C1, C2) ∈ F (E) s.t. Bi γi,Ei Ci for i = 1, 2 and Bi ≺γi,Ei Ci for at least one i = 1, 2. It follows
from Corollary 3.15, that the condition γ1
γ2
E1 ∼ E2, implies that the allocation (E1, E2) is the unique (up to
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replicability) Pareto optimal one. If γ1
γ2
E1 6∼ E2, a transaction involving the optimal claim B∗ will lead to a
Pareto optimal allocation.
4. Residual risk and an approximation of the indifference price
4.1. Agreement and the residual risk process. The notion of residual risk for the indifference price valu-
ation was defined in Musiela and Zariphopoulou (2004) for the setting of our Example 4.5., in Stoikov and Zariphopoulou
(2006) for the stochastic volatility model and in Musiela and Zariphopoulou (2006) for a binomial-type model.
This notion can be used to give a characterization of contingent claims in G (see Propositions 4.2 and 4.4
below). Before we state this characterization, we give a short introduction to residual risk in a static setting
(see Appendix B for definitions and some properties in the dynamic setting).
4.1.1. Residual risk in a static setting. Let γ > 0 be a risk-aversion coefficient, and let B ∈ L∞ be a contin-
gent claim. It can be shown that the optimization problem with the value function uγ(x|B − ν
(w) (B; γ)),
introduced in (3.1) admits an essentially unique maximizer ϑ(B) ∈ Θ (see Theorem A.3 in Appendix A,
Delbaen et al. (2002), page 105, Theorem 2.2 and Kabanov and Stricker (2002), page 127, Theorem 2.1).
The corresponding wealth process
X
(B)
t = ν
(w) (B; γ) +
∫ t
0
ϑ(B)u dSu,
can be interpreted as the optimal risk-monitoring strategy for the writer of the claim B, compensated by
ν(w) (B; γ) at the initial time. The hedging error
R(w)(B; γ) = B −X
(B)
T(4.1)
is called the (writer’s) residual risk. R(w)(B; γ) can be interpreted as the risk “left in B” after the optimal
hedging has been performed. Note that R(w)(B; γ) = 0, a.s., for all replicable claims B ∈ L∞. In the
conditional case, an analogous discussion and the decomposition formula (see (A.8))
ν(w)(B; γ|E) = ν(w) (B − E ; γ)− ν(w) (−E ; γ) ,
allow us to define the conditional residual risk R(w)(B; γ|E) by
R(w)(B; γ|E) = R(w)(B − E ; γ)−R(w)(−E ; γ),
and obtain the following decomposition
(4.2) B = ν(w)(B; γ|E) +
∫ T
0
ϑ
(B|E)
t dSt +R
(w)(B; γ|E)
where ϑ
(B|E)
t = ϑ
(B−E)
t − ϑ
(−E)
t , t ∈ [0, T ]. The process (ϑ
(B|E)
t )t∈[0,T ], as well as the decomposition
(4.2), could have been derived equivalently using the optimization problems used to define the conditional
indifference prices. All of the above concepts have natural analogues when seen from the buyer’s side.
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Namely, we define the (buyer’s) residual risk by R(b)(B; γ) = R(w)(−B; γ) and by R(b)(B; γ|E) = R(b)(B +
E ; γ)−R(b)(E ; γ) in the conditional case.
Remark 4.1. Using decomposition (4.2) and the Proposition A.2, we observe that
ν(b)(R(w)(B; γ|E); γ|E) = ν(b)(B; γ|E)− ν(w)(B; γ|E).
Hence, the agreement condition (3.7) can also be written as
B ∈ G ⇔ ν(b)(R(w)(B; γ|E); γ|E) ≥ 0.
In particular, ν(b)(R(w)(B; γ|E); γ|E) < 0 for all E ∈ R∞, and B ∈ L∞ \ R∞. We also note that
ν(w)(R(w)(B; γ|E); γ|E) = 0, for all E , B ∈ L∞.
The following proposition gives a characterization of mutually agreeable contingent claims in terms of
their residual risk.
Proposition 4.2. For B ∈ L∞, the following statements are equivalent:
(1) B ∈ G,
(2) the inequality
(4.3) EQ
[
R(w)(B; γ1|E1)
]
+ EQ
[
R(b)(B; γ2|E2)
]
≥ 0
holds for some Q ∈ Me,f .
(3) the inequality
(4.4) EQ
[
R(w)(B − E1; γ1)−R
(w)(−E1; γ1)
]
+ EQ
[
R(w)(−B − E2; γ2)−R
(w)(−E2; γ2)
]
≥ 0
holds for some Q ∈ Me,f .
(4) the inequality (4.3) holds for all Q ∈ Me,f .
(5) the inequality (4.4) holds for all Q ∈ Me,f .
Proof. It suffices to make the following two observations
(a) thanks to the definition (4.1) of residual risk, the differences ν(w)(B; γ1|E1) − R(w)(B; γ1|E1) and
ν(b)(B; γ2|E2)−R(b)(B; γ2|E2) are both of the form
∫ T
0 ϑt dSt with ϑ ∈ Θ, and
(b) the following equality holds
R(w)(B; γ1|E1)−R
(b)(B; γ2|E2) = R
(w)(B − E1; γ1)−R
(w)(−E1; γ1)
+R(w)(−B − E2; γ2)−R
(w)(−E2; γ2).

Remark 4.3. It should be pointed out that it is enough to check the above inequalities just for some probability
measure in Me,f . Also, it follows from the definition of the residual risk that the inequality (4.1) implies
that the transaction of claim B at any price p will decrease the sum of expected residual risks. If in addition
p ∈ (ν(w)(B; γ1|E1), ν(b)(B; γ2|E2)), each agent’s expected residual risk will be decreased.
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Under the additional mild assumption of left-continuity for the filtration F, we can replace the criterion
given in Proposition 4.2 by the following one (see Appendix B for the additional notation), which sometimes
is easier to check.
Proposition 4.4. Suppose that F is continuous. For B ∈ L∞, the following two statements are equivalent:
(1) B ∈ G, and
(2)
γ1E
Q(0)
[〈
R(w)(B − E1; γ1)
〉
T
−
〈
R(w)(−E1; γ1)
〉
T
]
+
+ γ2E
Q(0)
[〈
R(w)(−B + E2; γ2)
〉
T
−
〈
R(w)(E2; γ2)
〉
T
]
≥ 0
Proof. The equivalence follows from Proposition 4.2 and part (2) of Theorem B.1, which effectively state that〈
R(w)(B; γ)
〉
t
=
〈
L(w)(B; γ)
〉
t
for all t ∈ [0, T ], so that R(w)(B; γ) − γ2
〈
R(w)(B; γ)
〉
T
is a Q(0)-martingale,
for any γ > 0 and B ∈ L∞. 
Example 4.5. This example is set in an incomplete financial market similar to the one considered in
Musiela and Zariphopoulou (2004) (see, also, Henderson (2002)). The market consists of one risky asset
S = (St)t∈[0,T ] with dynamics
dSt = St
(
µ(t) dt+ σ(t) dW
(1)
t
)
and an additional (non-traded) factor Y = (Yt)t∈[0,T ] which evolves is a unique strong solution of
dYt = b(Yt, t) dt+ a(Yt, t)
(
ρdW
(1)
t + ρ
′dW
(2)
t
)
,
where W (1) = (W
(1)
t )t∈[0,T ] and W
(2) = (W
(2)
t )t∈[0,T ] are two standard independent Brownian Motions
defined on a probability space (Ω,F, (Ft),P). The constant ρ ∈ (−1, 1) is the correlation coefficient and
ρ′ :=
√
1− ρ2. We assume that the deterministic functions µ, σ : [0, T ]→ R are uniformly bounded (σ > 0).
By Theorem 3 in Musiela and Zariphopoulou (2004) (in Musiela and Zariphopoulou (2004) µ and σ are
constants, but their arguments carry over to our setting), we have that
(4.5) v(w) (B; γ) =
1
γ (1− ρ2)
ln
{
EQ
(0)
(
eγ(1−ρ
2)B
)}
,
for any payoff B ∈ L∞, such that B = g(YT ) for some bounded Borel function g : R → R, where the
Radon-Nikodym derivative of Q(0) is given by
dQ(0)
dP
= exp
(∫ T
0
1
2
λ2(t)dt+
∫ T
0
λ(t)dW
(1)
t
)
,
and λ(t) := µ(t)
σ(t) is the Sharpe ratio of S.
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Let us further suppose that E1 = g1(YT ) and E2 = g2(YT ) for some Borel bounded functions g1 and g2.
Proposition 3.4 and representation (4.5) imply that that B = g(YT ) ∈ G if and only if
EQ(0)
(
eγ1B˜e−γ1E˜1
)
EQ(0)
(
e−γ1E˜1
)


γ2
γ1
≤
EQ
(0)
(
e−γ2E˜2
)
EQ(0)
(
e−γ2E˜2e−γ2B˜
)
where B˜ = (1− ρ2)B and E˜i = (1− ρ
2)Ei, i = 1, 2.
As we have seen, ν(w) (B; γ1) > ν
(b) (B; γ2), ∀B ≁ 0. It is easy to verify that ν(w)(B; γ1|E1) ≤ ν(w) (B; γ1)
if and only if CovQ
(0)
(E1, B) ≥ 0, where Cov
Q(0)(., .) is the covariance under the measure Q(0). This means
that the presence of random endowment which is positively correlated with the claim payoff, reduces the
writer’s indifference price. Similarly, ν(b)(B; γ2|E2) ≥ ν
(b) (B; γ2) if and only if Cov
Q(0)(E2, B) ≤ 0. Therefore,
we infer that a necessary condition for a claim B to be mutually agreeable is that CovQ
(0)
(E1, B) > 0 or
CovQ
(0)
(E2, B) < 0.
4.2. An asymptotic approximation of indifference prices. When the size of the claim whose price
is negotiated is small compared to the sizes of agent’s contingent claims (and this is typically the case in
practice), one can use a Taylor-type expansion of the indifference price around 0, and obtain more precise
quantitative answers to the agreement question. More precisely, we assume that claim under consideration
has the form α ·B for a some vector B = (B1, . . . , Bn) in (L∞)n, where α ∈ Rn should be interpreted as a
small parameter. We start with a single agent’s point of view and present an approximation result for the
indifference price ν(w)(α ·B; γ|E) of α ·B, where E ∈ L∞ and γ > 0. To alleviate the notation, we shorten
ν(w)(α ·B; γ|E) to w(α), for α ∈ Rn.
A straightforward extension of Theorem 5.1 on page 590 in Ilhan et al. (2005), where we use the fact that
the conditional indifference prices are just the conditional ones under a changed measure, yields the following
result:
Proposition 4.6. The function w is continuously differentiable on Rn with
∇w(α) = EQ
(γα·B−γE)
[B] =
(
EQ
(γα·B−γE)
[B1], . . . ,E
Q(γα·B−γE) [Bn]
)
, α ∈ Rn.
The concept of minimized variance, defined below, is important for the study of second derivatives of the
function w.
Definition 4.7. Let Q ∈ Me be an arbitrary martingale measure.
(1) For B ∈ L∞ we define the projected variance ∆Q(B) of B under Q as :
(4.6) ∆Q(B) = inf
ϑ∈Θ2
Q
EQ
[
(B − EQ[B]− (ϑ · S)T )
2
]
,
where, Θ2Q = {ϑ ∈ L(S) : (ϑ · S) is square integrable martingale under Q}, so that
⋂
Q∈Me,f
Θ2Q ⊂ Θ.
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(2) For B1, B2 ∈ L∞ we define the projected covariance ∆Q(B1, B2) of B1 and B2 by polarization:
∆Q(B1, B2) =
1
2 (∆
Q(B1 +B2)−∆
Q(B1)−∆
Q(B2)).
(3) For a vector B = (B1, . . . , Bn) ∈ (L∞)n and a probability measure Q ∈ Me, we define the Q-
projected variance-covariance matrix ∆Q(B) by
∆
Q
ij(B) = ∆
Q(Bi, Bj), i, j = 1, . . . , n.
Remark 4.8.
(1) The projected variance ∆Q(B) is the square of the L2(Q)-norm of the projection PQ(B) of the
random variable B ∈ L∞ ⊆ L2(Q) onto the closed subspace R ⊕
{
(ϑ · S)T : ϑ ∈ Θ
2
Q
}
of L2(Q)
(the closeness of
{
(ϑ · S)T : ϑ ∈ Θ
2
Q
}
in L2(Q) is an immediate consequence of the L2(d[S])-L2(Q)
isometry of stochastic integration). It follows that the projected covariance ∆Q(B1, B2) can be
represented as
∆Q(B1, B2) = E
Q[PQ(B1)P
Q(B2)].
In particular, ∆Q(·, ·) is a bilinear functional on L∞ × L∞ and the following equality holds
∆Q(α ·B) = α ·∆Q(B)α =
n∑
i,j=1
αi∆
Q
ij(B)αj ,(4.7)
for all Q ∈Me, B ∈ (L∞)n and α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Rn.
(2) Details on the notion of the projected variance, which is closely related to mean-variance hedging,
can be found in Fo¨llmer and Sondermann (1986) or Schweizer (2001). Note that the existence of
the minimizer in the Definition 4.7 for bounded claims can be established using Kunita-Watanabe
decomposition of the uniformly integrable Q-martingale (Bt)t∈[0,T ] defined as Bt = E
Q[B|Ft]. For
details on the Kunita-Watanabe decomposition we refer the reader to Ansel and Stricker (1993).
We remind the reader that a filtration F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ] is said to be left-continuous if Ft = σ(∪s<tFs), for
all t ∈ (0, T ].
Lemma 4.9. Suppose that n = 1 and that the filtration F is left-continuous. Then for B, E ∈ L∞, the
function w : R→ R is twice differentiable at any α ∈ R and its second derivative is given by
(4.8) w′′(α) = γ∆Q
(γαB−γE)
(B).
Proof. Without loss of generality we may suppose that E = 0 - otherwise, we just work under the measure
P−γE . Let us focus on the case α = 0, where first derivative w′(0) is equal to EQ
(0)
[B] by Proposition 4.6,
so a simple translation by a constant (under which ∆ is clearly invariant) allows us to assume, in addition,
that EQ
(0)
[B] = 0. It will be enough, therefore, to show that
lim
α→0
∣∣∣∣ν(w) (αB; γ)α2 − γ2∆Q(0)(B)
∣∣∣∣ = 0.
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By the sign invariance of ∆(·) and the scaling property (A.3) of the indifference prices, it suffices to consider
only α > 0, i.e., it is enough to establish that
lim
αց0
∣∣∣∣ν(w) (B;αγ)α − γ2∆Q(0)(B)
∣∣∣∣ = 0(4.9)
Theorem B.1 and the definition of the residual risk in Appendix B state that
ν(w) (B;αγ)
α
=
γ
2
EQ
(0)
[〈L(w)(B;αγ)〉T ] =
γ
2
EQ
(0)
[L
(w)
T (B;αγ)
2],
where (L
(w)
t (B;αγ))t∈[0,T ] is as in Theorem B.1. The BMO-convergence of the processes (L
(w)
t (B;αγ))t∈[0,T ]
from the same theorem, implies, in particular, the L2(Q(0))-convergence of their terminal values, i.e.,
L
(w)
T (B;αγ)→ L
(w)
T (B; 0) in L
2(Q(0)).
Therefore, it remains to prove that
EQ
(0)
[
L
(w)
T (B; 0)
2
]
= ∆Q
(0)
(B), ∀B ∈ L∞.
Thanks to the final part of Theorem B.1, L(w)(B; 0) is strongly orthogonal to any process of the form (ϑ ·S),
for ϑ ∈ Θ2Q(0) . In particular, for ϑ ∈ Θ
2
Q(0) and ϑˆ
(B)
as in Theorem B.1, we have
B − (ϑ · S)T =
(
(ϑˆ
(B)
− ϑ) · S
)
T
+ L
(w)
T (B; 0),
so that
EQ
(0) [
(B − (ϑ · S)T )
2
]
= E
[((
(ϑˆ
(B)
− ϑ) · S
)
T
)2]
+ E
[
L
(w)
T (B; 0)
2
]
.
Consequently, the minimum in the definition of ∆Q
(0)
[B] is attained at ϑ = ϑˆ
(B)
so that ∆Q(B) =
EQ
(0)
[L
(w)
T (B; 0)
2], which is the equality we set out to prove.
For α 6= 0, we may again suppose that w′(α) = EQ
(γαB)
[B] = 0. Hence, it is enough to show that
limε→0
w(α+ε)−w(α)
ε2
= γ2∆
Q(αγB)(B). For this, we note that w(α + ε) − w(α) = v(w)(εB| − αB; γ) i.e., we
can rewrite the second derivative at some α 6= 0 as the second derivative at α = 0 with random endowment.
This observation finishes the proof. 
The case n > 1 is covered by the following lemma.
Lemma 4.10. For α, δ ∈ Rn, B = (B1, . . . , Bn) ∈ (L∞)n and E ∈ L∞, we have
lim
ε→0
w(α+ εδ)− w(α)− ε∇w(α) · δ
ε2
= 12
n∑
i,j=1
δi∆
Q
ij(B)δj .(4.10)
Proof. We can assume that α = (0, . . . , 0) by absorbing the term −α · B into the random endowment E .
The left-hand side of (4.10) can now be understood as the second derivative at 0 of the function w˜ : R→ R
given by
w˜(ε) = ν(w)(εδ ·B; γ|E).
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We can finish the proof by employing Lemma 4.9 and using the equality (4.7) with Q = Q(−γE) and δ
substituted for α. 
With the above results in our toolbox, we can give a second order directional Taylor-type approximation
of the indifference price.
Proposition 4.11. Choose B ∈ (L∞)n, α ∈ Rn, γ > 0 and E ∈ L∞, and assume that the filtration F
is left-continuous. With the notions of projected variance and covariance as in Definition 4.7, we have the
following equality
ν(w)(εα ·B; γ|E) = εα · EQ
(−γE)
[B] +
ε2γ
2
α ·∆Q
(−γE)
(B)α+ o(ε2), as ε→ 0.(4.11)
Although the asymptotic expansion (4.11) in Proposition 4.11 above is important in its own right, its
main application is the following criterion for mutual agreement for a small quantity of a given contingent
claim.
Proposition 4.12. Suppose that F is left-continuous and that the random endowments E1, E2 ∈ L∞ and
risk-aversion coefficients γ1, γ2 > 0 are chosen. Let B ∈ L∞ be a given contingent claim. The set G◦ contains
a segment of the form
{αB : α ∈ (0, α0)} for some α0 > 0 if and only if E
Q(−γ1E1) [B] < EQ
(−γ2E2)
[B],
and similarly, the set G◦ contains a segment of the form
{αB : α ∈ (−α0, 0)} for some α0 > 0 if and only if ,E
Q(−γ1E1) [B] > EQ
(−γ2E2)
[B].
Proof. We first note that the convexity of G◦ implies that if ∃ α0 > 0 such that α0B ∈ G◦, then αB ∈ G, ∀α ∈
[0, α0]. By equation (4.11), ν
(w)(αB; γ1|E1) = αEQ
(−γ1E1)
[B] + o(α) and ν(b)(αB; γ2|E2) = αEQ
(−γ2E2)
[B] +
o(α). Hence, the inequality EQ
(−γ1E1)
[B] < EQ
(−γ2E2)
[B] yields that there exists α0 > 0 small enough such
that ν(w)(α0B; γ1|E1) < ν(b)(α0B; γ2|E2), i.e., α0B ∈ G◦.
On the other hand, suppose that there exists α0 > 0 such that α0B ∈ G◦ and assume that EQ
(−γ1E1)
[B] ≥
EQ
(−γ2E2)
[B]. It is easy to check that ∆Q
(−γiEi)
(B) > 0 for i = 1, 2 (since B /∈ R∞) and that by (4.11) and
its buyer’s version, we get
αEQ
(−γ1E1)
[B] +
α2γ1
2
∆Q
(−γ1E1)
(B) < αEQ
(−γ2E2)
[B]−
α2γ2
2
∆Q
(−γ2E2)
(B) + o(α2)
for every α close to zero such that 0 < α ≤ α0 (note that thanks to the linearity of Θ
2
Q, we have ∆
Q(B) =
∆Q(−B), ∀B ∈ L∞).
This gives that for any such α
α2
2
(γ1∆
Q(−γ1E1)(B) + γ2∆
Q(−γ2E2)(B)) + o(α2) < 0,
Dividing through by α2 and letting α → 0, we get that γ1∆
Q(−γ1E1)(B) + γ2∆
Q(−γ2E2)(B) ≤ 0, which is a
contradiction. The proof of the second argument is similar and hence omitted. 
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Remark 4.13. Proposition 4.12 can be used to provide an approximation of the size of the set of the agreement
prices for small number of units. More precisely, if EQ
(−γ1E1)
[B] 6= EQ
(−γ2E2)
[B], it holds that
(4.12) ν(b)(αB; γ2|E2)− ν
(w)(αB; γ1|E1) =
= α(EQ
(−γ2E2)
[B]− EQ
(−γ1E1)
[B])−
α2
2
(γ1∆
Q(−γ1E1)(B) + γ2∆
Q(−γ2E2)(B)) + o(α2)
for every α ∈ R close to zero such that αB ∈ G◦. Another application of Proposition 4.12 is given at the
first part of Remark 5.9.
A second order approximation of the optimal strategy has been recently given in Kramkov and Sirbu
(2006) for general utilities defined on the positive real line. For the Example 4.5, the corresponding approxi-
mation result is easily obtained for the unconditional case by the formula (4.5) (see, e.g., Henderson (2002)).
After changing the measure P to P−γE , it is straightforward to show that
ν(w)(αB; γ|E) = αEQ
(−γE)
[B] +
α2
2
γ(1− ρ2)VarQ
(−γE)
(B) + o(α2), ∀B ∈ L∞,
where VarQ(B) denotes the variance of random variable B under the probability measure Q.
Example 4.14. In the cases where there is no closed-form expression for the indifference price, the approxi-
mation (4.11) is rather useful. One of these cases is the stochastic volatility model studied in Sircar and Zariphopoulou
(2005) and Ilhan et al. (2004) (see also Henderson (2007)). Proposition 4.12 is then a generalization of the
approximation results of Ilhan et al. (2004), subsection 4.3.
5. Partial equilibrium prices
This section deals with the existence and the uniqueness of a partial equilibrium price of a contingent claim
in the simplified two-agent economy. The discussion of mutual agreeability in previous sections assumed that
the number of units is fixed and the claim is indivisible. If, however, the negotiation between agents involves
the quantity traded as well as the price, and if this quantity is not constrained by quantization, a great deal
more can be said about the outcome of the negotiation. The main advantage is that the methodology of
equilibrium theory can be applied and a unique price-quantity pair singled out on the basis of the fundamental
economic principle of market clearing.
5.1. The partial equilibrium. A vector B = (B1, . . . , Bn) ∈ (L∞)n of contingent claims is chosen and
kept constant throughout this section. The extended set R ∪ {±∞} of real numbers is denoted by R.
It will be notationally convenient to define the “restrictions” U i : R
n
× Rn → R, i ∈ {1, 2} of the value
functions uγ1(·|E1) and uγ2(·|E2) (see (3.1)) by
U i(α;p) =


uγi(α · (B − p)|Ei), α ∈ R
n,
lim supα′→α,α′∈Rn U i(α
′;p), α ∈ R
n
\ Rn,
i ∈ {1, 2} , p ∈ Rn.(5.1)
21
i.e., U i(·;p) is the extension of the continuous function U i(·;p)
∣∣∣
Rn
to R
n
by upper semi-continuity and gives
the indirect utility of agent i when she holds α units of B, purchased at price p.
Definition 5.1. The demand correspondence Zi : Rn → 2R
n
, for the agent i ∈ {1, 2}, is defined by
Zi(p) = argmax
{
U i(α,p) : α ∈ R
n
}
, p ∈ Rn.(5.2)
Intuitively, the elements of Zi(p) give the numbers of units of B that agent i is willing to purchase at
price p (the numbers of units that maximize her indirect utility). Using the above notation and definition,
we are ready to introduce the central concept of the section:
Definition 5.2. A pair (p,α) ∈ Rn × Rn is called a partial-equilibrium price-quantity (PEPQ) if
α ∈ Z1(p) and −α ∈ Z2(p).(5.3)
A vector p ∈ Rn for which there exists α ∈ Rn such that (p,α) is a PEPQ is called a partial-equilibrium
price (PEP).
In other words, the PEP is the price-vector of the contingent claim B at which the quantity that one
agent is willing to sell is equal to the quantity which the other agent is wants to buy.
When there exists α ∈ Rm such that the contingent claim α ·B is replicable, any PEP p must have the
property that α · p = pNA, where pNA is the replication price of α ·B; this will hold no matter what the
characteristics of the agents are. It is, therefore, only reasonable to assume that such claims do not enter
the negotiation, i.e., we enforce the following assumption for the remainder of the section:
Assumption 5.3. There exists no α ∈ Rn \ {0} such that α ·B ∼ 0.
5.2. Properties of the demand functions. Let PNA ⊆ Rn be the set of all arbitrage-free price-vectors
of the contingent claims B, i.e.,
PNA =
{
EQ[B] : Q ∈ Me
}
,
where, as usual, EQ[B] = (EQ[B1], . . . ,EQ[Bn]) ∈ Rn. To simplify the notation in the sequel, we introduce
two n-dimensional families of measures in Me, parametrized by α ∈ Rn:
Q(α)i = Q
(γiα·B−γiEi), α ∈ Rn, i = 1, 2.
As we will see below (see Proposition 5.6), when we are looking for partial equilibrium prices, we can restrict
ourselves to the sets
PUi =
{
EQ
(α)
i [B] : α ∈ Rn
}
, for i = 1, 2.
In general, PUi ⊆ P
NA, for i = 1, 2. The equality holds when Ei ∼ 0 (see Ilhan et al. (2005), Lemma 7.1).
For future use, we define the function ui : Rn → R by ui(p) = sup
α∈R¯n
{U i(α;p)}, for i ∈ {1, 2}. Building on
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the notation of Section 4, we also introduce the following two shorthands:
(5.4)
wi(α) = ν
(w)(α ·B; γi|Ei)
bi(α) = ν
(b)(α ·B; γi|Ei)

 α ∈ Rn, i ∈ {1, 2} .
Lemma 5.4. For i = 1, 2, wi is strictly convex and bi is strictly concave.
Proof. A change of measure argument (where we replace P by P−γiEi) can be employed to justify no loss of
generality if we assume that Ei = 0 in this proof. The fact that wi(·) is convex follows from the convexity of
the indifference price. In order to establish that the convexity is, in fact, strict, we assume, to the contrary,
that there exist α1,α2 ∈ Rn with α1 6= α2 and λ ∈ (0, 1) such that
wi(λα1 + (1− λ)α2) = λwi(α1) + (1− λ)wi(α2).
Equivalently, we have
ν(w) ((λα1 + (1 − λ)α2) ·B; γi) = ν
(w)
(
λα1 ·B;
γ1
λ
)
+ ν(w)
(
(1− λ)α2 ·B;
γ1
1−λ
)
Since (γi
λ
)−1 + ( γi1−λ )
−1 = (γi)
−1, we can use Lemma A.7 to conclude that
α1 ·B ∼ α2 ·B, i.e. α ·B ∼ 0, where α = α1 −α2 6= 0 ∈ R
n,
a contradiction with Assumption 5.3. A similar argument can be employed to prove strict concavity of bi,
i ∈ {1, 2}. 
Proposition 5.5. For i ∈ {1, 2}, the functions ui(·) and Zi(·) have the following properties
(1) The maximum in (5.2) is always attained, i.e. Zi(p) 6= ∅, for all p ∈ Rn.
(2) For p ∈ Rn, we have
Zi(p) = argmaxα∈Rn{ν
(b)(α ·B; γi|Ei)−α · p}.(5.5)
(3) Either Zi(p) = {α} for some α ∈ Rn or Zi ⊆ R
n
\ Rn.
(4) Zi(p) = {α} if and only if EQ
(α)
i [B] = p (in particular, p ∈ PUi ).
Proof.
(1) It follows for the fact that the function Zi is upper semi-continuous on the compact space R
n
.
(2) It suffices to observe that (3.6) implies that
ui(p) = − exp{−γi sup
α∈R¯n
(ν(b)(α ·B; γi|Ei)−α · p)} ·
(
− uγi(0|Ei)
)
, for all p ∈ Rn.(5.6)
(3) The set Zi(p) is convex, so if it contains a point in Rn and a point in R
n
\ Rn, it must contain
infinitely many points in Rn. This is in contradiction with the strict concavity of bi on Rn.
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(4) Proposition 4.6 states that bi is continuously differentiable on Rn and that ∇bi(α) = EQ
(−α)
i [B].
Therefore, ν(b)(α · B; γi|Ei) − α · p is a concave and differentiable function of α ∈ Rn and its
derivative is given by EQ
(−α)
i [B] − p. Consequently, ν(b)(α ·B; γi|Ei) − α · p attains its maximum
on Rn if and only if EQ
(−α)
i [B] = p has a solution α ∈ Rn. In that case, Zi(p) = {α}.

Proposition 5.6. A pair (pˆ, αˆ) is a PEPQ if and only if pˆ ∈ PU1 ∩ P
U
2 , α ∈ R
n and
(5.7) EQ
(αˆ)
1 [B] = EQ
(−αˆ)
2 [B] = pˆ.
Proof. If (pˆ, αˆ) is a PEPQ, then Zi(pˆ) ∩ Rn 6= ∅ and, so, by Proposition 5.5, part (3), we must have
Zi(pˆ) = {αi}, for some αi ∈ Rn and pˆ ∈ PUi , for i = 1, 2. By (5.3), we have α1 = −α2. The equalities in
(5.7), with αˆ = α1 follow directly from part (4) of Proposition 5.5.
Conversely, suppose that (5.7) holds. Then, by part (4) of Proposition 5.5, we have Z1(p) = {αˆ} and
Z2(p) = {−αˆ}, which, in turn, implies (5.3). 
We have also shown the following result which will be used shortly:
Corollary 5.7. A pair (pˆ, αˆ) ∈ (PU1 ∩ P
U
2 )× R
n is a PEPQ if and only if
w1(αˆ)− b2(αˆ) ≤ w1(α)− b2(α) for any α ∈ R
n, and pˆ = ∇w1(αˆ).
The main result of this Section is presented in the following Theorem:
Theorem 5.8. Let E1, E2 ∈ L∞, γ1, γ2 > 0 and B ∈ (L∞)n be arbitrary, and suppose that the Assumption
5.3 is satisfied. Then, there exists a unique partial equilibrium price-quantity (α,p) ∈ Rn × Rn. Moreover,
p ∈ PU1 ∩ P
U
2 .
Proof. If the PEPQ (α,p) exists, then α globally minimizes the strictly concave function w1− b2, so it must
be unique. To establish existence, it will be enough to solve the equation ∇f = 0, where f = w1 − b2.
Assume, to the contrary, that ∇f(α) 6= 0, for all α ∈ Rn. Continuity of f implies that for each m ∈ N there
exists αm ∈ Bm = {α ∈ Rn :
∑n
i=1 |αi| ≤ m} such that f(αm) ≤ f(α) for all α ∈ Bm. Thanks to strict
convexity of f and the fact that ∇f 6= 0 on Bm, we must have ||αm||1 = m, where ||α||1 =
∑n
i=1 |αi|. In
order to reach a contradiction, it will be enough to show that
lim inf
m→∞
f(αm)
m
> 0.(5.8)
Indeed, (5.8) would provide the following coercivity condition
lim inf
m→∞
inf
{
f(α)
||α||1
: α ∈ Bm \ {0}
}
> 0,
which, in turn, would guarantee existence of a global minimizer α0 ∈ Rn for f (see Chapter 1 of Borwein and Lewis
(2000)), at which ∇f(α0) = 0 holds.
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The first step in the proof of (5.8) uses the representation (A.8) and the risk-measure properties of
ν(w)(·; γ|E) to obtain the following:
lim inf
m→∞
f(αm)
m
= lim inf
m→∞
1
m
(
ν(w) (αm ·B − E1; γ1) + ν
(w) (−αm ·B − E2; γ2)
)
≥ lim inf
m→∞
1
m
(
ν(w) (αm ·B; γ1)− ||E1||L∞ + ν
(w) (−αm ·B; γ2)− ||E2||L∞
)
= lim inf
m→∞
(
ν(w)
(
1
m
αm ·B;mγ1
)
+ ν(w)
(
− 1
m
αm ·B;mγ2
) )
(5.9)
Any subsequence of N through which the last limit inferior in (5.9) above is realized admits a further
subsequence (mk)k∈N such that the sequence
1
mk
αmk converges to some α0 ∈ R
n with ||α0||1 = 1; indeed,
the full sequence ( 1
m
αm)m∈N takes values in the compact set {α ∈ Rn : ||α||1 = 1}. Proposition A.14 implies
that
ν(w)
(
1
mk
αmk ·B;mkγ1
)
→ sup
Q∈Me
EQ[α0 ·B], and
ν(w)
(
− 1
mk
αmk ·B;mkγ2
)
→ − inf
Q∈Me
EQ[α0 ·B],
(5.10)
as k →∞. Therefore,
lim inf
m→∞
1
m
f(αm) = sup
Q∈Me
EQ[α0 ·B]− inf
Q∈Me
EQ[α0 ·B].
It remains to note that the equality supQ∈Me E
Q[α0 · B] = infQ∈Me E
Q[α0 · B] cannot hold; if it did,
Assumption 5.3 would be violated. 
Remark 5.9.
(1) When n = 1, the proof above can be simplified considerably; one can show that
lim
α→∞
w′1(α) > lim
α→∞
b′2(α) and lim
α→−∞
w′1(α) < lim
α→−∞
b′2(α),
and deduce the existence of the solution of the equation w′1(α) = b
′
2(α) directly.
In addition, by Remark 4.13, we easily get that the quantity α˜ = E
Q(−γ2E2) [B]−EQ
(−γ1E1)
[B]
γ1∆Q
(−γ1E1) (B)+γ2∆Q
(−γ2E2) (B)
minimizes the second order approximation of the difference w1(α) − b2(α). In view of Corollary
5.7, we can heuristically consider α˜ as an approximation of the partial equilibrium quantity (PEQ),
provided that α˜ is close to zero.
(2) Corollary 3.15 and the discussion preceding it show that when γ1
γ2
E1 ∼ E2, the unique PEPQ must be
of the form (0,p), where p = EQ
(−γ1E1)
[B] = EQ
(−γ2E2)
[B] for every B which satisfies the Assump-
tion 5.3. In such cases p should not be interpreted as a price of B, since no transaction actually
occurs. Furthermore, the strict agreement (in the sense of Definition 3.3) can then be reached for
no contingent claim of the from α ·B, α ∈ Rn.
Even when γ1
γ2
E1 ≁ E2, there might exist claims for which the PEPQ is of the form (0,p). In
fact, PEPQ is of the form (0,p) if and only if EQ
(−γ1E1)
[B] = EQ
(−γ2E2)
[B] (see Proposition 4.12).
As an example, consider a claim B which is independent of the the stochastic process S, as well as
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the two random endowments. The partial equilibrium price is then simply a certainty equivalent
p = E[B] = EQ
(−γ1E1)
[B] = EQ
(−γ2E2)
[B].
If a vector of claims B satisfies the Assumption 5.3 and its PEPQ is of the form (0,p), then
ν(w)(α ·B; γ1|E1) − ν(b)(α ·B; γ2|E2) > 0, for every α ∈ Rn \ {0}, i.e. α ·B /∈ G for all α 6= 0. In
other words, any trade in a nontrivial linear combination α ·B must make at least one of the agents
strictly worse off.
Appendix A. Conditional Indifference Prices
The subject of this Section is the conditional indifference price and some of its properties. The results
stated below are not only very useful for our analysis mutually agreeability, they may also be seen as
interesting in their own right since they describe some of the aspects of indifference evaluation under the
presence of random endowment. Some new results about the unconditional indifference price (see Lemma
A.7, Propositions A.10, A.11 and A.14), as well as several generalizations of existing results in the case of
the conditional price (see Theorem A.3, Propositions A.5 and A.13) are exhibited.
A.1. First properties. We remind the reader that the writer’s and buyer’s conditional (relative) indiffer-
ence prices ν(w)(B; γ|E) and ν(w)(B; γ|E), for B ∈ L∞, are defined as
ν(w)(B; γ|E) = inf {p ∈ R : p−B ∈ Aγ(E)} , ν
(b)(B; γ|E) = sup {p ∈ R : B − p ∈ Aγ(E)} ,
where Aγ(E) = {B ∈ L∞ : uγ(B|E) ≥ uγ(0|E)}, with the notation introduced on page 7 at the beginning of
Section 3. Proposition A.1 collects some basic properties of the indifference prices and its proof is standard.
Proposition A.1.
(1) ν(b)(B; γ|E) = −ν(w)(−B; γ|E), for B ∈ L∞.
(2) When E ∈ R∞ (in particular, when E is constant) ν(w)(·; γ|E) and ν(b)(·; γ|E) coincide with their
unconditional versions ν(w) (·; γ) and ν(b) (·; γ).
(3) More generally, we have ν(w)(·; γ|E) = ν(w)(·; γ|E ′) and ν(b)(·; γ|E) = ν(b)(·; γ|E ′) as soon as E ∼ E ′.
When E is constant or, more generally, when E ∈ R∞, ν(w)(·; γ|E) and ν(b)(·; γ|E) are usually denoted by
ν(w) (·; γ) and ν(b) (·; γ), and are called the (writer’s and buyer’s) unconditional indifference prices.
A.2. Conditional indifference prices as convex risk measures. With the notation from subsection
2.4, the conditional indifference price ν(w)(·; γ|E) can be understood as an unconditional indifference price
computed under the probability measure P−γE . In particular, using the terminology of Fo¨llmer and Schied
(2004), Section 4.8, the following statement holds:
Proposition A.2. Maps B 7→ ν(w)(−B; γ|E) and B 7→ −ν(b)(B; γ|E) are replication-invariant convex risk
measures on L∞, where replication-invariance refers to the following property
ν(w)(B + (ϑ · S)T ; γ|E) = ν
(w)(B; γ|E), for all ϑ ∈ Θ.
26
Moreover, these measures admit a robust dual representation, as stated in the following theorem, which
follows from Theorem 2.2 in Delbaen et al. (2002) and Theorem 2.1 in Kabanov and Stricker (2002):
Theorem A.3. (Delbaen F., Grandits P., Rheinla¨nder T., Samperi D., Schweitzer M. and Stricker C.,
2002, Kabanov Y. and Stricker C., 2002)
For B ∈ L∞, we have
(A.1) ν(w)(B; γ|E) = sup
Q∈Ma
{
EQ (B)−
1
γ
h−γE(Q)
}
,
where, for C ∈ L∞, we define the map hC : L1 7→ [0,+∞] as
hC(Q) =


H(Q|PC)−H(Q(C)|PC) when Q ∈Ma,
+∞ otherwise.
The supremum in (A.1) is uniquely attained by the measure Q(−γE+γB), which belongs in Me,f and its
Radon-Nikodym derivative with respect to P−γE+γB can be written as
dQ(−γE+γB)
dP−γE+γB
= ke(−γϑ
(−γE+γB)·S)T ,(A.2)
where ϑ(−γE+γB) ∈ Θ is the maximizer of the control problem associated with the value function uγ(−B|E).
Corollary A.4. The maps B 7→ ν(w)(B; γ|E) and B 7→ ν(b)(B; γ|E) are, respectively, lower and upper
semi-continuous with respect to the weak-* topology σ(L∞,L1).
Proof. It suffices to note that (A.1) represents ν(w)(·; γ|E) as a supremum of σ(L∞,L1)-continuous and linear
functionals on L∞. 
The function h−γE(·) in Theorem A.3 is sometimes called the penalty function for the indifference price
ν(w)(·; γ|E), and is clearly convex (strictly convex on its effective domainMe, f). It is well known (see, e.g.,
Fo¨llmer and Schied (2004), Lemma 3.29) that the conjugate representation,
E[X logX ] = sup
Y ∈L∞
(
E[Y X ]− logE[eY ]
)
,
where we use the convention that x log(x) = +∞, for x < 0, is valid for all X ∈ L1. Using this representation
and the natural identification of finite measures equivalent to P with their Radon-Nikodym derivatives in
L1, we can readily establish the following properties of the penalty function h:
Proposition A.5. For C ∈ L∞, hC : L1 7→ [0,+∞] is convex (strictly on its effective domain) and
σ(L1,L∞)-lower semicontinuous.
An immediate corollary of Proposition A.5 and the Hahn-Banach Theorem in the separation form (see
Fo¨llmer and Schied (2004) for details on convex analysis and Jouini et al. (2006), Theorem 2.1) is the fol-
lowing result:
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Proposition A.6. The map h−γE is the minimal penalty function for ν
(w)(·; γ|E), i.e.
h−γE(Q) ≤ h˜(Q), for all Q ∈Ma,
whenever the function h˜ satisfies
ν(w)(B; γ|E) = sup
Q∈Ma
(
EQ (B)−
1
γ
h˜(Q)
)
, for all B ∈ L∞.
Moreover, we have the following, dual, conjugate representation
1
γ
h−γE(Q) = sup
B∈L∞
(
EQ[B]− ν(w)(B; γ|E)
)
, ∀Q ∈ L1(Ω,FT ,P−γE).
A.3. Some auxiliary results. Using the linearity of the set Θ of the admissible trading strategies and
the properties of the exponential utility, one can deduce (see Becherer (2001), Chapter 1) that the following
scaling property holds true:
αν(w) (B;αγ) = ν(w) (αB; γ) , for B ∈ L∞, γ, α > 0.(A.3)
The following Lemma (which is used several times in the present paper) states that the risk measures induced
by the indifference price has a certain subadditive property, with true additivity holding only in exceptional
cases.
Lemma A.7. For B1, B2 ∈ L∞ and γ1, γ2 > 0, let γ˜ > 0 be given by
1
γ˜
= 1
γ1
+ 1
γ2
. Then,
(a) ν(w) (B1; γ1) + ν
(w) (B2; γ2) ≥ ν(w) (B1 +B2; γ˜), and
(b) the following two conditions are equivalent
(1) ν(w) (B1; γ1) + ν
(w) (B2; γ2) = ν
(w) (B1 +B2; γ˜),
(2) γ1
γ˜
B1 ∼
γ2
γ˜
B2.
Proof.
(a) Using the dual representation (A.1), the inequality in (a) above is equivalent to the following in-
equality
(A.4) sup
Q∈Ma
(
EQ[B1] −
1
γ1
h(Q)
)
+ sup
Q∈Ma
(
EQ[B2] −
1
γ1
h(Q)
)
≥ sup
Q∈Ma
(
EQ[B1 + B2] −
1
γ˜
h(Q)
)
,
which always holds for elementary reasons.
(b) (1)⇒ (2). If the equality in (1) above holds, then it also holds in (A.4). By strict convexity of the
function h(·) in this effective domain, i.e. onMe,f , and the scaling property (A.3), this is equivalent
to equality of dual minimizers
Q(
γ1
γ˜
B1) = Q(
γ2
γ˜
B2) = Q(B1+B2).
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By the representation (A.2) of the Radon-Nikodym derivatives of the above measures, we get
k1e
(ϑ
(
γ1
γ˜
B1)·S)T e
γ1
γ˜
B1 =
dQ(
γ1
γ˜
B1)
dP γ1
γ˜
B1
dP γ1
γ˜
B1
dP
=
dQ(
γ1
γ˜
B1)
dP
=
=
dQ(
γ2
γ˜
B2)
dP
=
dQ(
γ2
γ˜
B2)
dP γ2
γ˜
B2
dP γ2
γ˜
dP
= k2e
(ϑ
(
γ2
γ˜
B2)·S)T e
γ2
γ˜
B2 ,
and so γ1
γ˜
B1 −
γ2
γ˜
B2 = (ϑ · S)T + k, where k = log(k2)− log(k1) and ϑ = ϑ
(
γ2
γ˜
B2) − ϑ(
γ1
γ˜
B1).
(2) ⇒ (1). Conversely, suppose that γ1
γ˜
B1 −
γ2
γ˜
B2 = (ϑ · S)T + k, for some k ∈ R and ϑ ∈ Θ.
Using the scaling property (A.3), the equality in (1) is equivalent to
1
γ1
ν(w)
(
γ1
γ¯
B1; γ¯
)
+
1
γ2
ν(w)
(
γ2
γ¯
B2; γ¯
)
=
1
γ¯
ν(w) (B1 +B2; γ¯)(A.5)
By the risk equivalence between γ1
γ˜
B1 and
γ2
γ˜
B2 and the replication invariance of ν
(w) (·; γ¯), we have
1
γ1
ν(w)
(
γ1
γ¯
B1; γ¯
)
+
1
γ2
ν(w)
(
γ2
γ¯
B2; γ¯
)
=
1
γ1
ν(w)
(
γ1
γ¯
B1; γ¯
)
+
1
γ2
ν(w)
(
γ1
γ¯
B1 + k + (ϑ · S)T ; γ¯
)
=
1
γ¯
ν(w)
(
γ1
γ¯
B1; γ¯
)
+
k
γ2
.
(A.6)
On the other hand,
1
γ¯
ν(w) (B1 +B2; γ¯) =
1
γ¯
ν(w)
(
B1 +
γ1
γ2
B1 +
γ¯
γ2
(k + (ϑ · S)T ); γ¯
)
=
1
γ¯
ν(w)
(
γ1
γ¯
B1; γ¯
)
+
k
γ2
.(A.7)
The equality in (A.5) now follows directly from (A.6) and (A.7). 
The conjugacy between (affine transformations of) ν(w)(·; γ|E) and h(·), as displayed in Theorem A.3 and
Proposition A.6, yields directly the following auxiliary result:
Lemma A.8. For E , E˜ ∈ L∞, γ > 0, the following two statements are equivalent
(1) ν(w)(B; γ|E) ≥ ν(w)(B; γ|E˜), for all B ∈ L∞,
(2) h−γE(Q) ≤ h−γE˜(Q), for all Q ∈Ma.
We use Lemma A.8 in the proof of the following proposition:
Proposition A.9. For E ∈ L∞ and γ > 0, the following statements are equivalent:
(1) ν(w) (B; γ) ≥ ν(w)(B; γ|E), for all B ∈ L∞,
(2) ν(w) (B; γ) = ν(w)(B; γ|E), for all B ∈ L∞,
(3) E ∈ R∞, and
(4) Q(0) = Q(−γE).
Proof. (4) ⇒ (3) Just like in the proof of implication (1) ⇒ (2) in Lemma A.7, we can use the equation
(A.2) in Theorem A.3 to show that (4) implies (3).
(3)⇒ (2) Follows immediately from statement (3) in Proposition A.1.
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(2)⇒ (1) Clearly, (1) is weaker than (2).
(1)⇒ (4) By Lemma A.8, the equality in (2) implies that h−γE(Q) ≥ h(Q), for all Q ∈Ma, i.e.
H(Q|P−γE)−H(Q
(−γE)|P−γE ) ≥ H(Q|P)−H(Q
(0)|P), ∀Q ∈Ma.
In particular, for Q = Q(−γE), we get
H(Q(−γE)|P) ≤ H(Q(0)|P).
Therefore, Q(−γE) = Q(0), by the strict convexity of the relative entropy H(·|P) on its effective domain. 
Considered as convex risk measure, the indifference price is not homogeneous. In fact, the homogeneity
holds only for replicable claims as the following proposition states.
Proposition A.10. For B, E ∈ L∞ and γ > 0, the following statements are equivalent:
(1) ν(w)(αB; γ|E) = αν(w)(B; γ|E), for some α ∈ R \ {0, 1},
(2) B ∈ R∞.
Proof. We assume, for simplicity, that E = 0 (otherwise, we simply change the underlying probability to
P−γE).
(2)⇒ (1) If B ∈ R∞, then αB ∈ R∞, so (1) follows from the replication-invariance of ν(w) (·; γ).
(1)⇒ (2) Suppose, first, that (1) holds with α > 0. Then
sup
Q∈Ma
(
EQ[B]−
1
γ
h(Q)
)
= sup
Q∈Ma
(
EQ[B]−
1
αγ
h(Q)
)
.
The two maximized functions are strictly concave, ordered and agree only for Q such that h(Q) = 0.
Therefore, the equality of their (attained) suprema forces the relation h(Q(γB)) = h(Q(αγB)) = 0, which,
in turn, implies that Q(γB) = Q(αγB) = Q(0). We can conclude that B ∈ R∞ by using the implication
(4)⇒ (3) in Proposition A.9.
It remains to treat the case α < 0. By considering the random variable |α|B instead of B, it is clear that
we can safely assume that α = −1, i.e., ν(w) (−B; γ) = −ν(w) (B; γ). Equivalently, we have
inf
Q∈Ma
(
EQ[B] +
1
γ
h(Q)
)
= sup
Q∈Ma
(
EQ[B]−
1
γ
h(Q)
)
,
which, by positivity of h(·), implies that h(Q(γB)) = 0. We continue as above to conclude that B ∈ R∞. 
A.4. Relationship between conditional and unconditional indifference prices. It has been observed
(see Remark 1.3.2 in Becherer (2001)) that the conditional indifference price can be written as difference of
two unconditional ones:
(A.8) ν(w)(B; γ|E) = ν(w) (B − E ; γ)− ν(w) (−E ; γ) = ν(w) (B − E ; γ) + ν(b) (E ; γ) .
A similar relationship, namely ν(b) (B; γ) = ν(b) (B + E ; γ)−ν(b) (E ; γ) = ν(b) (B + E ; γ)+ν(w) (−E ; γ), holds
for the buyer’s conditional indifference prices.
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A.5. ν(w)(B; γ|E) as a function of γ. It is a known property of the unconditional indifference price that
the mappings γ 7→ ν(w) (B; γ) and γ 7→ −ν(b) (B; γ) are non-decreasing. In fact, we have the following, more
precise, statement
Proposition A.11. For γ > 0 and B ∈ L∞, the mapping γ 7→ ν(w) (B; γ) (γ 7→ ν(b) (B; γ)) is
(1) constant and equal to the value EQ[B], constant over Q ∈ Ma, when B ∈ R∞, and
(2) strictly increasing (decreasing), otherwise.
Proof. We only deal with the writer’s price ν(w) (B; γ). The case of the buyer’s price is parallel.
(1) By the replication invariance of the ν(w) (·; γ), the value of ν(w) (B; γ) equals to the value EQ[B],
Q ∈ Ma, when B ∈ R∞.
(2) Suppose now that ν(w) (B; γ1) ≤ ν(w) (B; γ2), for some 0 < γ1 < γ2. By the dual representation
(A.1), we have ν(w) (B; γ1) = ν
(w) (B; γ2), and using the scaling property (A.3), we get
αν(w) (B; γ2) = ν
(w) (αB; γ2) ,
where α = γ2/γ1 > 1. By Proposition A.10, B ∈ R∞.

A similar proposition in the conditional case fails. Indeed, here is a simple example. Pick E 6∈ R∞, and
set B = E , Then ν(w)(E ; γ|E) = ν(b) (E ; γ) - a strictly decreasing function of γ. An even more instructive
example in which the dependence of γ ceases to be monotone at all is given below.
Example A.12. We adopt the setting of Example 4.5, and assume that the coefficients b and a are chosen
in such a way that the distribution of the random variable YT is diffuse (under P, and, therefore, under every
equivalent martingale measure). Let Q(0) be the minimal-entropy martingale measure and let gi : R→ R, i =
1, 2 be two bounded Borel-measurable functions. We set E = −g1(YT ) and B = g2(YT )−g1(YT ), and compute
the conditional indifference price ν(w)(B; γ|E) as a difference ν(w)(B; γ|E) = ν(w) (B − E ; γ) − ν(w) (−E ; γ).
By the expression (A.8) and the formula (4.5), we have
ν(w)(B; γ|E) = ν(w) (g2(YT ); γ)− ν
(w) (g1(YT ); γ)
=
1
γ(1− ρ2)
(
lnEQ
(0)
[exp(γ(1− ρ2)g1(YT ))]− lnE
Q(0) [exp(γ(1− ρ2)g2(YT ))]
)
.
(A.9)
The intervals of monotonicity of the mapping γ 7→ ν(w)(B; γ|E) therefore coincide with the intervals of
monotonicity of the function f : (0,∞)→ R given by
f(γ) =
1
γ
(
lnEQ
(0)
[Xγ1 ]− lnE
Q
(0)
[Xγ2 ]
)
,
where the bounded and positive random variables Xi, are given by Xi = exp((1 − ρ
2)gi(YT )), i = 1, 2. It
is clear that, thanks to the assumption of diffusivity of the random variable YT , any pair of probability
distributions with compact support in (0,∞) can be chosen for X1 and X2 by the appropriate choice of the
functions g1 and g2.
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Thanks to the boundedness of X1 and X2, we can easily obtain the following asymptotic expansion for
the function f around γ = 0:
f(γ) = EQ
(0)
[X1]− E
Q
(0)
[X2] +
1
2γ(VarQ(0) [X1]−VarQ(0) [X2]) + o(γ).
In a similar manner, we have
lim
γ→∞
f(γ) = ln ||X1||L∞ − ln ||X2||L∞ .
Therefore, if X1 and X2 satisfy
(1) EQ
(0)
[X1] < EQ
(0)
[X2], and
(2) VarQ(0) [X1] < VarQ(0) [X2],
the function f is strictly decreasing and negative in a neighborhood of γ = 0. If, in addition
(3) ||X1||L∞ > ||X2||L∞ ,
holds, this trend cannot continue for all γ since f(+∞) = ln (||X1||L∞/||X2||L∞) > 0 > E[X1] − E[X2] =
f(0+). The straightforward construction of examples of the random variables X1 and X2 having the above
properties is left to the reader.
A.6. Asymptotics of the conditional indifference prices. The asymptotics of the unconditional indif-
ference prices in the risk-aversion parameter γ are well-known (see, for instance, Corollary 5.1 in Delbaen et al.
(2002) or Proposition 1.3.4 in Becherer (2001)):
lim
γ→0
ν(w) (B; γ) = EQ
(0)
[B], lim
γ→+∞
ν(w) (B; γ) = sup
Q∈Me,f
EQ[B],
lim
γ→0
ν(b) (B; γ) = EQ
(0)
[B], lim
γ→+∞
ν(b) (B; γ) = inf
Q∈Me,f
EQ[B].
(A.10)
Using the decomposition (A.8), these are easily extended to the conditional case:
Proposition A.13. For B, E ∈ L∞, we have
lim
γ→0
ν(w)(B; γ|E) = EQ
(0)
[B], lim
γ→+∞
ν(w)(B; γ|E) = sup
Q∈Me,f
EQ[B − E ] + inf
Q∈Me,f
EQ[E ], and
lim
γ→0
ν(b)(B; γ|E) = EQ
(0)
[B], lim
γ→+∞
ν(b)(B; γ|E) = inf
Q∈Me,f
EQ[B − E ] + sup
Q∈Me,f
EQ[E ], and
(A.11)
One can, further, establish the continuous differentiability of the map γ 7→ ν(w)(B; γ|E), for γ ∈ (0,∞),
by noting the fact that
ν(w)(B; γ|E) =
1
γ
(
ν(w) (γ(B − E); 1)− ν(w) (−γE ; 1)
)
(A.12)
and using it together with the result of Theorem 5.3 in Ilhan et al. (2005) which states that the function
γ 7→ ν(w) (γC; 1) is continuously differentiable on (0,∞) for C ∈ L∞.
For n ∈ N, let (L∞)n denote the set of all n-tuples B = (B1, . . . , Bn) of elements of L∞, with ||B||(L∞)n =
maxk≤n ||Bk||L∞ . For α = (α1, α2, . . . , αn) ∈ R
n, we write α · B =
∑n
k=1 αkBk ∈ L
∞ and set |α| =
maxk≤n |αk|.
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Proposition A.14. For E ∈ L∞ and B ∈ (L∞)n, the function w : Rn × (0,∞]→ R given by
w(α, γ) =


ν(w)(α ·B; γ|E), γ <∞
supQ∈Me,f E
Q[α ·B − E ] + infQ∈Me,f E
Q[E ], γ = +∞,
(A.13)
is jointly continuous, and Lipschitz continuous on every subset D of its domain of the form D = [γ0,∞)×Rn,
γ0 > 0.
Proof. The functional B 7→ ν(w)(B; γ|E) is positive and coincides with identity on constants, so for γ ∈
(0,∞), ∣∣∣ν(w)(α1 ·B; γ|E)− ν(w)(α2 ·B; γ|E)∣∣∣ ≤ ||(α1 −α2) ·B||L∞ ≤ |α1 −α2| ||B||(L∞)n .(A.14)
For γ = +∞, the validity of (A.14) follows by passing to the limit γ → ∞. On the other hand, by (A.12),
for B ∈ L∞, γ0 > 0 and γ1, γ2 ∈ [γ0,∞), we have∣∣∣ν(w)(B; γ1|E)− ν(w)(B; γ2|E)∣∣∣ ≤ 1
γ0
(∣∣∣ν(w) (γ1(B − E); 1)− ν(w) (γ2(B − E); 1)∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣ν(w) (−γ1E ; 1)− ν(w) (−γ2E ; 1)∣∣∣)
≤
1
γ0
(||B − E||L∞ + ||E||L∞) |γ1 − γ2| .
(A.15)
Therefore, for each γ0 > 0, there exists a constant C = C(γ0) > 0 such that
|w(α1, γ1)− w(α2, γ2)| ≤ C (|γ1 − γ2|+ |α1 −α2|) , for γ1, γ2 ∈ [γ0,∞), α1,α2 ∈ R
n.
The existence of the limit w(α,∞) = limγ→∞ w(α, γ) is the final ingredient in the proof. 
Appendix B. The residual risk process
In this Section, we deal with the the notion of the residual risk in the dynamics setting, i.e., the residual-
risk process. We first recall the definition of dynamic version of the (conditional) indifference price.
B.1. A dynamic version of the indifference price. In addition to the study of the indifference prices
ν(w)(B; γ|E) and ν(b)(B; γ|E) defined at time t = 0, one can restrict attention to any subinterval [t, T ] of [0, T ],
and consider the filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Fu}u∈[t,T ] ,P) and the stock-price process {Su}u∈[t,T ].
The (conditional) indifference price of the contingent claim B, defined on this restricted model, is denoted
by ν
(w)
t (B; γ|E). More precisely (see Mania and Schweizer (2005), Proposition 12, page 2127 for details),
ν
(w)
t (B; γ|E) can be defined to be the a.s.-unique solution of the following equation
(B.1) esssup
ϑ∈Θ
E
[
− exp
(
− γ
(
E +
∫ T
t
ϑu dSu + ν
(w)
t (B; γ|E)−B
))∣∣∣Ft]
= esssup
ϑ∈Θ
E
[
− exp
(
− γ
(
E +
∫ T
t
ϑu dSu
))∣∣∣Ft].
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One can show using standard dynamic-programming methods (see e.g. Mania and Schweizer (2005)) that,
when seen as a stochastic process, (ν
(w)
t (B; γ|E))t∈[0,T ] admits a ca´dla´g modification. The process (ν
(w)
t (B; γ|E))t∈[0,T ],
modified so as to become ca´dla´g, is called the writer’s indifference price process for the claim B. A natural
analogue corresponding to the buyer’s price can be introduced in a similar fashion.
B.2. The residual risk process. Having defined the dynamic version (ν
(b)
t (B; γ|E))t∈[0,T ] of the indifference
price process, one can render the notion of the residual risk introduced in Section 3, dynamic, too. More
precisely, the writer’s residual risk process (R
(w)
t (B; γ|E))t∈[0,T ] is defined by
R
(w)
t (B; γ|E) = ν
(w)
t (B; γ|E)− ν
(w)(B; γ|E)−
∫ t
0
ϑ
(B|E)
u dSu.
(note that R
(w)
T (B; γ|E) = R
(w)(B; γ|E)). We can define the buyer’s residual risk process by R
(b)
t (B; γ|E) =
R
(w)
t (−B; γ|E). It is straightforward that
R
(w)
t (B; γ|E) = R
(w)
t (B − E ; γ|E)−R
(w)
t (−E ; γ|E), t ∈ [0, T ].(B.2)
and that the process (R
(w)
t (B; γ|E))t∈[0,T ] admits a ca´dla´g modification. It has been shown in Mania and Schweizer
(2005) (see Theorem 13) that when F is left-continuous, the residual risk process admits a representation in
terms of a martingale orthogonal to S. We state the straightforward extension of this result to the conditional
case below.
Theorem B.1 (Mania M. and Schweizer M. (2005)). Suppose that the filtration F is continuous, and let the
process (R
(w)
t (B; γ|E))t∈[0,T ] be as above. Then there exists a process (L
(w)
t (B; γ|E))t∈[0,T ] such that
(1) (L
(w)
t (B; γ|E))t∈[0,T ] is a Q
(−γE)-martingale in the space BMO(Q(−γE)), and
(2) R
(w)
t (B; γ|E) = L
(w)
t (B; γ|E)−
γ
2 〈L
(w)(B; γ|E)〉t.
When E ∼ 0, the family {L(w)(B; γ)}γ>0 admits a limit L(w)(B; 0), as γ ց 0, in BMO(Q(0)). The process
L(w)(B; 0) can be identified as a term in the Kunita-Watanabe decomposition
Bt = EQ(0) [B] +
∫ t
0
ϑˆ
(B)
u dSu + L
(w)
t (B; 0), t ∈ [0, T ],(B.3)
of the Q(0)-martingale Bt = EQ
(0)
[B|Ft], where ϑˆ
(B)
is an S-integrable predictable process for which (ϑˆ
(B)
·
S) a Q(0)-square integrable martingale. In particular, L(w)(B; 0) is strongly orthogonal to any Q(0)-local
martingale of the form (ϑ · S), ϑ ∈ L(S).
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